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Abstract
We propose and numerically analyze an agent-based simulation model of the spectrum frequency trading
mechanism, where the heterogeneous agents take on the role of primary users. The interactions with the demand of
the secondary users are considered. The model is constructed on the basis of Bak-Sneppen model of coevolution
where the extremal dynamics is used to activate the low profitable users. Here, the strategies of the primary users are
coevolving. They are characterized by the spectrum prices and cooperation intensity levels. The primary users interact
indirectly by means of the demand stimulation of the secondary users and an insurance pool, which is provided by
the spectrum exchange management system. The existence of the insurance pool is motivated by the needs of
avoidance of the financial losses. The simulation results indicate the reliability of the insurance mechanism. In
addition, several notable phenomena have emerged from the interactions of agents. The price increase resulting from
the spontaneously formed oligopolistic practices of agents is considered as the most emergent feature of the model.
Keywords: Agent-based simulations; Bak-Sneppen; Cognitive radio; Spectrum trading
1 Introduction
The frequency spectrum is a highly limited and an essen-
tial resource of wireless communication. With an increas-
ing number of services densely utilizing the available
frequency resources, the spectrum becomes heavily over-
crowded. In order to alleviate such situation, an efficient
system of exploiting of licensed frequency bands can
be applied. The regulatory concept presented under the
name cognitive radio has been introduced in [1] to make
spatially and temporarily unused fragmented frequency
bands usable and thus to improve the spectral efficiency.
The dynamic interaction in terms of free spectrum
sharing among licensed (i.e., primary) and unlicensed
(i.e., secondary) users provides additional benefits for
both parties involved. The leasing of unused spectrum to
the secondary users (SUs) constitutes an additional rev-
enue for the primary users (PUs) [2]. On the other hand,
the SUs are not obligated to sign a long-term contract
with the state regulator and could opportunistically use
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the already available free frequency resources based on a
short-term contact with no regulator requirements. This
dynamic mediation among the PUs and SUs is referred to
as the spectrum trading mechanism. Its constituents are
spectrum trading and sharing processes. In the light of
these trends in the organizational structure, it is expected
that the market-driven cognitive radio environment will
consist of a large number of PUs providing spectrum
access to SUs in order to earn additional profit.
The PUs are potentially exposed to different forms of
the technology and market risks. In case of technology
risks, ‘the incumbent operators are naturally favoring the
harmonized approach (i.e. cooperation) since it decreases
risks regarding the diffusion of the new technologies they
have invested in and guarantees economies of the scale
effects’ [3]. The market risk is mainly concerned with the
price fluctuations and demand shocks.
The basic presumption of most of the previous models
and studies is the strict distinguishing between cooper-
ative and non-cooperative (selfish) regimes of the PUs
involved in the market. In contrast, in our present paper
the infinite variety of semi-cooperative or ‘fuzzy’ coop-
erative behavior is taken into account. We are exploring
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the model of hybrid or fuzzy cooperation supplied by the
adaptive actions related to the adjustment of cooperation
level. The fuzzy cooperation expresses itself in the insur-
ance mechanism, which accounts for systematic and also
anomalously large losses caused by the stochastic nature
of the cognitive radio market. These eventualities are cov-
ered by the compensation insurance policy. Note that the
insurance mechanism in the cognitive radio context has
already been postulated by Haiming et. al. [4] in case
of SUs preventing the potential accident, i.e., transmis-
sion failure incurred by the excessively low signal-to-noise
ratio (SNR).
Many different kinds of techniques describing the spec-
trum trading process have been introduced in order to
make the spectrum trading scenarios nearly optimal given
both PUs and SUs. Microeconomic approach, coopera-
tive and non-cooperative game-theoretic framework, and
analysis of spectrum auctions are now seen as essential
steps in this direction. But for now, there are still many
potential difficulties with the mentioned approaches due
to the performance constraints on managing a large num-
ber of users in the market. As recent forecasts show
[5], the main limitation will occur when ubiquitous wire-
less connectivity will be available, mobile devices will be
the primary means for Internet access, and seven trillion
wireless devices will have served seven billion people.
In order to provide a more holistic view of integrat-
ing the scientific ideas with technological demands, we
adopt the agent-based modeling and simulation (ABMS)
approach [6], which is able to capture the behavior of
dozens of entities operating on the market. The first
strength of ABMS consists of its ability to encompass the
efforts and attributes of individual autonomous entities.
They can be easily implemented and quite flexibly mod-
ified (reprogrammed) responding to immediate needs.
The second strength involves the emergent behavior.
According to [7] ‘by modeling large number of interact-
ing agents - each having the own objectives and char-
acteristics and the ability to make decisions - complex
macro-scale aggregate dynamics emerge.’ Observing the
emergent behavior, new insights can arise from the results
of simulations. The third strength is the relative simplicity
and robustness of ABMS. ABMS reduces the complexity
of the system control by replacing the aggregated outcome
of a phenomenon, which is difficult to explain or to pre-
dict, mostly without applying complicated decision rules
of self-aware entities at a lower level [7]. All the above
attributes help the natural opening of the application of
the ABMS into cognitive radio management.
Inspired and motivated by the success of ABMS in gen-
eral, we introduce here an agent-based cognitive radio
model based on the Bak-Sneppenmodel of coevolution [8]
of species on local sites. In [9] the economic applications
of this specific model has been discussed. An important
note is that Bak-Sneppen model or its idea is not applied
here to PUs as agent entities or species; instead, coevolv-
ing are their strategies composed of information about
prices and cooperation membership. The cognitive radio
model we suggest is primarily designed to a situation, in
which a large number of PUs are interacting. The model
embraces the complex scenarios, which cannot be sim-
ply extrapolated from the properties of its constituents.
Since PUs are exposed to different types of operational
perturbations, a sufficient level of robustness is necessary
to ensure their dynamic stability. In addition, the safeness
and reliability of the financial activity is also necessary for
the efficient spectrum pricing. In this regard, the applica-
tion of the Bak-Sneppen model can be seen as a blueprint
of our thinking framework, partly justified by the fact that
its evolutionary nature may provide a very robust shield
against a wide class of perturbations.
The main contributions of the paper may be summa-
rized as follows. In contrary to published works where
mostly analytical formulations of the spectrum trading
problem are discussed (refer to Section 2 for the lit-
erature overview), the research presented in this paper
provides specific implementation of the ABMS modeling
to the problem of the spectrum pricing. The model con-
sists of the set of rules that regulate interactions, which
yields eventually to the spontaneous formation of the par-
tially oligopolisticmarket structure. This is perceived here
as an emergent phenomenon identifiable via the price
effects. The most significant is the interaction between
PUs mediated by the demand of the SUs. Its variability
causes the changes in profit, which stimulate Bak-Sneppen
mechanism to modify the spectrum prices and levels of
cooperation.
Another important contribution of the paper is the
application of the insurance mechanism in the spectrum
trading market. The novelty that is the underlying theme
in all our work is that insurance contract needs not be
permanently signed or executed, but is instead designed
to allow each PU (consumer) to explore individual vari-
able ‘fuzzyfied’ participation (cooperation) in the unified
and standardized insurance system. Thus, our model may
be regarded as a specific model of the risk management
in the cognitive radio network, which can be used to
hedge against the risk of uncertain loss. The hypothesis
about the partial elimination of the financial losses and
financial risk elimination of the PUs has been supplied
by our simulations. The dynamical model we propose
introduces indirect financial form of interaction between
agents mediated by the insurance pool. This arrangement
of related agents may be considered (from the information
flow modeling point of view) as an instance of message
transfer infrastructure [10].
The paper is organized as follows. The overview of ear-
lier work on the problem of spectrum trading is given in
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Section 2. The basic relations, which relate the demand
of SUs to the profits of PUs of the presented model,
are introduced in Section 3. The relations between spec-
trum demand of SUs to the profits of PUs are discussed.
The simulation procedures, which describe the insurance
policy, are presented in Section 4. The results and compu-
tational details are provided in Section 5, followed by the
conclusions.
2 Related work
Current activities leading to the deregulation of the spec-
trum pose an additional question regarding the efficient
spectrum resources’ sharing and trading. In general, the
interaction among the PUs may be of the cooperative or
competitive character. In case of competition, PU’s aim
is to maximize their individual profits at the expense of
profit reduction of other PUs [11-13]. When a coalition is
formed, the cooperating PUs are aware of the situation of
each other and their activities maximize the overall profit
of the coalition [14].
In this regard, the problem of the spectrum trading
among a PU and multiple SUs is discussed in [11]. Here,
the interactions between participants is formulated as
a non-cooperative game, and the static and dynamic
aspects as well as monopolistic concepts are investigated.
Stackelberg game jointly maximizing the utilities of the
PU and SUs is introduced in [15]. The research outcomes
presented in [11] are extended in [13,16]. In the research
work in [13], the scenario where multiple PUs are sell-
ing the spectrum opportunities to the group of SUs is
investigated. Based on the behavior of the PUs, three
different pricing schemes are discussed: (1) market equi-
librium pricing scheme, (2) competitive pricing scheme
based on the Bertrand model, and (3) cooperative pricing
scheme. The main outcome from this work suggests that
the cooperative pricing maximizes the total profit of all
PUs involved on the market. The effect of dynamic per-
turbation (i.e., irrationality of the SUs) in the competitive
pricing scheme is examined in [16]. The work by Duan
et. al. in [17] shows that maximum profit loss due to the
competition is not larger than 25% compared to the coop-
erative case. Further results on the cooperative behavior
of the PUs are analyzed in [18].
Another type of interaction between the PUs is a
collusion. The collusion among PUs in the competi-
tive spectrum pricing scenario is investigated in [19].
In this work, the optimal pricing achieving the high-
est profit is adopted using the collusion contract among
all participating PUs. In contrary, in [20] the pricing-
based collusion-resistant dynamic spectrum allocation
approach is proposed to optimize the overall spectrum
efficiency not only for keeping the participating incen-
tives of the selfish users but also combating the possible
collusions.
The application of the portfolio theory in the cogni-
tive radio markets is introduced by Wysocki et al. in [21].
The authors investigate the potential of portfolio theory
to provide a framework for the spectrum management of
QoS risk and reward in the wireless communication. New
economic terms such as ‘risk aversion’, ‘risk-rewarded
trade-off ’, and ‘economic welfare’ are introduced in rela-
tion to cognitive radio framework. We make use of the
conclusion delivered in [21] and further elaborate on the
concept of reduction of the risk aversion based on the
insurance pool established by the PUs.
3 Cognitive radiomodel - demand and profit
In this paper, we adopt the exchange-based cognitive
radio trading market scenario established in [22]. The
authors introduce the particular interacting entities in the
exchange-based model as follows:
1. Spectrum exchange is an entity that provides and
maintains a market place for bringing together the
activities of the PUs and SUs. It also publicizes prices
and anonymizes the trading entities. In this paper, we
consider that the spectrum exchange acts as a
pooling point that enables the delivery of wireless
services through spectrum acquired by a buyer in
exchange. Moreover, the spectrum exchange has no
band manager functionality, i.e., it only facilitates the
trading of the spectrum among entities in the market
without holding any spectrum inventory itself. In
addition to above - mentioned features, the spectrum
exchange also maintains the insurance pool
discussed later in the paper.
2. Spectrum license holder is an entity that owns a
spectrum license and offers it for trading in exchange
for the financial compensation. In general, the
spectrum license holder uses the spectrum to satisfy
the subscribers who signed for the flat rate (i.e.,
primary connections) and the additional spectrum
capacities are further re-sold to Spectrum license
requesters.
3. Spectrum license requester is an entity that submits
bids for spectrum licenses with the intent to acquire
the license. From now on, for the sake of clarity,
Spectrum license holder and Spectrum license
requester will refer to the wireless communication
service providers to the PUs and SUs, respectively.
We consider a cognitive radio system with Npu PUs,
where the ith PU owns the frequency spectrum of
bandwidth Wi (see Equation 7). The PU aims to sell the
portion of the unused frequency bandwidth to the SUs
(i.e., not allocated frequency channels in FDMA scheme).
In this scenario, the offers to sell and the bids to buy the
unused spectrum determines the winning bid and passes
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the spectrum usage from the PU to the SU. The initial
handshake between the PU and SU is handled over the
control channel through the spectrum exchange and after
successful initialization (i.e., successful spectrum sharing
and tradingmechanisms negotiation), the PU allocates the
frequency channel to the SU. Equilibrium demand of ith
user is supposed in the form related to the utility ui
beq,i = btot ui∑Npu
j=1 uj
, i = 1, 2, . . . ,Npu . (1)
The relation is constructed to satisfy the following con-
straint on the total demand btot from the all SUs
Npu∑
i=1
beq,i = btot. (2)
Here we suppose that all spectrum needs of the SUs are
ideally satisfied. The relation Equation 1 is adapted from
the more frequently used probabilistic context, where
normalization is required as well. To model the role of
price and quality perception, we exploited formula ui ≡
ui(ki, pi) = wb,i(ki/pi)β where wb,i is the geographic pref-
erence for ith PU, ki/pi is the quality ki to price pi ratio.
Such setting describes perfect rationality of SUs as β →
∞, while the irrational behavior occurs for β → 0. Fur-
thermore, we use the intermediate choice β = 1, which
yields
beq,i = btot wb,iki/pi∑Npu
j=1 wb,j kj/pj
. (3)
The weighting wb,i simply expresses the fact that even
in the case of the unique price and unique quality, there
remains a preference beq,i ∼ wb,i caused by the unequal
relatively persistent geographic conditions (i.e., localiza-
tion of SU in the PU’s cell). The dynamics of the demand
adaption to equilibrium value can be described by the
model
b(t+1)i = b(t)i + abe (b(t)eq,i − b(t)i ) . (4)
Here the constant 1/abe represents the equilibration time.
In the equivalent pseudocode style [6], we plan to use
further the change in demand which is written as bi ←
bi + abe(beq,i − bi). The combining of Equations 3 and 4
implies the time invariance
Npu∑
i=1
b(t)i = btot. (5)
In the business activities of firms, the profit (or more pre-
cisely gross profit) is defined as a difference between rev-
enue and the component costs of delivered goods services.
Regarding our specific interest to emphasize structure of
the problem, we use the stylized form of the profit of the
ith PU as





where bipi is the revenue of PU and the quadratic term
with PU specific parameter b(p)i describes the costs due
to underload or overload related to the spectrum utiliza-
tion. In other words, the term b(p)i − bi means deviation
of demand from the renting out capacity. The value b(p)i
(see also Equation 13) has been chosen on the basis of the
calibration where the unique price of all PUs is supposed
as starting point and the differences in demand thus stem
only from the heterogeneous spectrum efficiency. One
can see that the costs are proportional to the parameter(s)
apr,i. The formula for pri is a straightforward adaption of
the well known and more comprehensive relation [11] for
the profit of the quality of service performance








where Wi is the spectrum size, Breqi is the bandwidth
requirement per user, c1 and c2 are constant weights for
the revenue and cost functions, Mi is the number of pri-
mary ongoing connections, c1Mi is the revenue gained
from the primary connections served by the PUs, k(p)i
is the spectral efficiency of the wireless transmission
provider for primary service i. We see that the revenue
from the primary users is a linear function of the num-
ber of ongoing users. The quadratic term represents the
cost due to the quality of service degradation of ongo-
ing primary users due to sharing the radio spectrum with
secondary service. The term arises when the required
bandwidth cannot be provided.
The transformation of Equation 7 to Equation 6 can be
simply obtained using




pri = Profiti − c1Mi , (8)






What is important here is that relation Equation 8
explains variable pri (we are dealing with further), which
characterizes the part of the profit free from c1Mi term.
The motivation for this step is that we want to study
just the profitability related to sharing with SUs. In this
way our model is less concerned with the determinants of
active ongoing primary connections. The additional bene-
fit from the above rescaling is that instead of specifying of
numeric values Wi, Breqi , Mi, and k
(p)
i separately, we have
to specify b(p)i only.
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4 Insurance policy
In general, the role of the insurance system is a trans-
fer of the risk from one agent to another. We suppose
that in order to protect themselves against accidental and
unpredictable loss, or provide a temporary respite from
stagnation (characterized here by the profit returns), the
PUs decide to establish the pooling fund (insurance trust).
The paper presents the theoretical arguments and sim-
ulations that show how the statistics of profits may be
modified by the insurance under the unsteady price and
demand conditions of economic environment. The insur-
ance is the way in which the user can also better han-
dle situations where a sudden unpredictable change in
price and demand occurs. The application of insurance
within the cognitive radio context could also be moti-
vated by technological reasons. Some wireless commu-
nication systems must be built in disadvantaged areas
with volatile consumer demands. The inequalities in
terms of operation conditions require new thinking on
risk assessment to attract PUs. Their freedom and flex-
ibility, allowing reliable transition from the beginning
of the insurance contract until its end, and vice versa,
should be designed and maintained by modern wireless
services.
We assume that financial transfers between PUs and
insurance pool can be completely managed by the
spectrum exchange entity. This cognitive radio component
has been proposed in [22]. At each evaluation period, the
PUs are required to provide automatic insight to their
profit/loss statement. Let us assume that actual cooper-
ation levels (characterized by col, see section ‘Insurance
fee’ for details) of PUs are stored on the side of the spec-
trum exchange server. Using this specific information, the
spectrum exchange server ‘decides’ between the asking
for an insurance fee or providing an adequate financial
compensation.
4.1 Insurance fee
In this subsection, we postulate the computational steps
related to the problem of insurance fee prinsu. The algo-
rithm we suggested (a) requires to pay an insurance fee
in the case of the positivity of the instant transformed
profit prl (i.e., no loss); it assumes prinsu > 0 (the
notation here ignores the subscript i); (b) assumes prinsu
is proportional to the instant fuzzy cooperativeness (or
fuzzy participation) parameter col ∈ [0, 1]; (c) assumes
that fees collected from the PUs are accumulated in the
insurance pool prpool > 0. Thus, the adaptively varying
co(t)l expresses the instant ownership interest with respect
to pool. The dynamic state variables changing with the
insurance fee activity are comprised in the configuration
tuple
〈 pr1, pr2, . . . , prNpu , co1, co2, . . . , . . . , coNpu , prpool 〉. (9)
The dynamics of its components is described by the
following pseudocode
loop over the PU
if (prl > 0) then
{
prinsu ← col prl (10)
prpool ← prpool + prinsu
col ← max { 0, col − unif[0, amodn] }
prl ← prl − prinsu
}
end loop,
where l = 1, 2, . . . ,Npu; the term unif[0, amodn] denotes
the random number drawn uniformly randomly from
the interval [0, amodn], where amodn > 0 is the param-
eter of the drop in the cooperation level. The agent’s
action col ← max{ 0, col − unif[0, amodn] } is exac-
erbated by unwillingness to pay the insurance fee. As
we will demonstrate by simulations, the choice of the
parameter amoup > 0 affects the strengthening of insur-
ance functions (motion up in col) and stabilization of
indirect cooperation process via insurance. The rules in
Equation 10 belong to decentralized fuzzy cooperation
dynamics where each PU operates as a separate entity
with actual col shaped by the individual satisfaction,
preferences, and insurance levels in the contracts.
4.2 Compensation policy and large loss policy
In this subsection we describe the rules for the man-
agement of the calculation of the compensation prcomp
fee (which is again agent specific but denoted here with-
out lower index) received by the PU recipients from the
side of insurance provider. We suppose that the proce-
dure is conditioned by the state prl < 0 (of lth user).
The salient principles of the compensation we supposed
are the following: (a) the fairness to insure in accor-
dance to the level of cooperation and instant stage of
the pool; (b) the supposition of the large compensation
in the case of the rare instances conditioned by the suf-
ficiency of the former level of the cooperation col >
acoth, where acoth is the threshold parameter; and (c) the
willingness to develop cooperation caused by the grati-
tude due to actual compensation and perception of the
insurance credibility. The details of the cooperation coor-
dinated by the insurance depend on the random process
determined by the parameters amodn, amoup, aco, and acoth
(the role of the parameter amoup is the subject of thor-
ough numerical simulation). We suppose the decisions of
insurer are dependent on the instant mean cooperation
level






The detailed information on the items of the insurance
compensation process are captured by the pseudocode
part
loop over l









prcomp ← prpool min
{








(prcomp< |prl|) and (prpool> |prl|) and (col>acoth)
)
then prcomp ← |prl|
}
else { prcomp ← 0 }




We see from here that compensation fee is considered
to be proportional to the pool and the level of the coop-
eration col. The constant aco/(Npucomean) is included in
determination of prcomp due to normalization reasons.
The fairness becomes partially confirmed when one reads
Equation 10 showing that higher col in the past yields
higher fees prinsu = colprl into the insurance pool. How-
ever, it is important to recognize that fairness is harmed
by delays (between the usage and accumulation of sav-
ings), fluctuations, and rare events. The updates described
by Equation 12 also incorporate decision process where
the management is concerned with compensation of the
extraordinary large losses (−prl) > prcomp, prl < 0. The
protection of the insurance provider is controlled by the
precaution parameter aco > 0.
Let us turn to the particular question of the choice of the
system of constants b(p)i from Equation 6. Suppose that in
order to get closer to the profit optimality (but not really
the most precise adjustments), the PU makes preliminary
(before signing a contract) recognition of the spectrum
demands. The process may be formally associated with
the setting of the constants b(p)i , i = 1, 2, . . . ,Npu. Sup-
pose as well that they are determined under the idealized
assumption about the uniqueness of the estimated price
pi  pest. It causes the structure of Equation 3 admits







4.3 The adaption of the Bak-Sneppenmodel of the
coevolution
In part of our computational work, we are guided by the
construction of the Bak-Sneppen model of the coevo-
lution of interacting species. It was originally applied
to exhibit the emergent phenomenon known under the
notion of self-organized criticality. When applied to the
extended populations of species, the model is capable to
explain their universal features such as nontrivial power-
law distributions of sizes of extinction events and phe-
nomenon of punctuated equilibrium. The Bak-Sneppen
model belongs to the models based on the extremal
dynamics [23]. Here we are focused on the optimization
potential of these models [24]. In the original formula-
tion, the dynamics is suggested to repeatedly eliminate
the least adapted species. This may be mutated, changed,
or modified in some stochastic way in common with the
changes imposed on the topological neighbors. The key
factor driving the changes is the relative fitness of an agent
(entity). When speaking about the Bak-Sneppen adap-
tations to the economic situations, the fitness may be
naturally associated to the variations of the net profit. The
survival of the spices/agents (PUs) can be related to the
survival of the strategies of PUs and the topological rela-
tions (interaction network) of the species becomes equiv-
alent to the financial interactions mediated by the demand
of SUs.
In our scheme exploiting Bak-Sneppen model, the indi-
rect interaction among PUs is mediated by the variable
demand of SUs. The vector of the demands (b(t)1 , b
(t)
2 , . . .




2 , . . . , p
(t)
Npu). The





where the time labels (t) refer to the subsequent Monte
Carlo steps t − 1 and t. Now the different selection
pressures may be considered. The objects of evolution are
strategies contained in the following pairs
{
〈p(t)1 , co(t)1 〉 , 〈p(t)2 , co(t)2 〉, 〈p(t)Npu , co(t)Npu〉
}
. (15)
By borrowing from Bak-Sneppen model, we direct the
evolutionary activity on selection of the lowest fitness
entity of the index
Horváth et al. EURASIP Journal onWireless Communications and Networking 2013, 2013:261 Page 7 of 14
http://jwcn.eurasipjournals.com/content/2013/1/261
j(t)min ← arg min{ pr(t)ret,1, pr(t)ret,2, . . . , pr(t)ret,Npu }. (16)
The selection yields to the price update via the stochastic
rule





where apm ∈ (0, 1) is the price adaption parameter.
The model describes the situation where the ‘regressing’
agents want to avoid from the profit dropping. The
Equation 17 guarantees price variation within the pre-
defined bounds [pdn, pup], pdn > 0 under the simple
assumption that the initial price value of the series also
originates from the interval [pdn, pup]. The PUs are obli-
gated to accept the lowest and highest spectrum price in
compliance with the requirements of the state regulation.
The demand form Equation 2 supposes that all the SUs
are satisfied independently of the price level and ability of
pay. The SUs decide by giving preference to quality and
price (the level of rationality is dictated by β) provided by
certain PU. The feedback mechanism represented by Bak-
Sneppen dynamics (Equation 17) then operates between
the price setting pjmin and outputs of PUs. Thus, there is
no bargaining on the spectrum price in the present ver-
sion of the model. The assumption here is that extremal
dynamics comprised in Equations 16 and 17 suits well for
unpredictable market situations.
The choice of jmin corresponds to the agent expressing
irrational financial unsatisfaction. To avoid the financial
stagnation, the Bak-Sneppen type agent decides to change








Beyond this extremal event is the belief that some different
level of cooperativeness should guarantee higher profits.
The stochastic rule expresses the fact that stagnation
changes are believed to be based on the motives of the
cooperation in the positive or negative sense. The inten-
sity of moves is defined by the constant parameter amoext.
We see that the aspect of predictability and informa-
tion about the behavior of the competitors (cooperators)
is absent in this model. This property is used to mimic
efficiency of the decisions and actions executed on the
complex unpredictable financial markets where the infor-
mation access is limited and the decision makers cannot
recognize the courses of actions of other agents. One of
the main purposes of our simulation approach is to test
the robustness of the suggested system with very limited
information exchange.
It should be noted that, if the level of profit pri in
Equation 16 (instead of prret,i) is chosen to control selec-
tion (coevolutionary changes), the dynamics will vary
chronically the strategies of low-profit users (preferably
those with small efficiency ki). In contrast, the strate-
gies of large PUs (having large ki) remain unchanged.
The preliminary simulation experience has shown us that
such systems ‘gets stuck’ close enough to some trivial
modes (trivial attractors) with fluctuations coming only
from frequent changes of the smallest users (PUs), but
do not translate into major system changes (avalanches).
Thus, we may suppose that systems coevolving on the
basis of prret,i are more sensitive and more stirred
up.
The situation with relative measure resembles that in
survival of the small and large businesses. In the eco-
nomic context, the relative measures of efficiency are
known to be more reliable than absolute ones. Never-
theless, the ‘rescaling’ we considered seems to us more
appropriate for the modeling of the systems of differ-
ent scale. Let us emphasize that the mentioned size
differences are not present in the original Bak-Sneppen
model.
4.4 Choice and potential impact of uniform generators
In summary, we can say that stochastic changes enter
into the proposed simulation model in the form: (i) uni-
directional updates of the cooperation level col described
by the Equations 10 and 12 and (ii) extremal dynamics
updates involved in Equations 17 and 18.
Multitude of simulation studies exists where the gener-
ators of uniform distributions are commonly used. Their
choice is usually considered to be a good starting point
for systems where the actual distributions are not known
or not simply deducible from elementary principles. In
the case of Equations 17 and 18, the assumption of uni-
formity is in line with the original Bak-Sneppen coevo-
lution model, where the local low fitness nodes (agents)
are updated with uniformly distributed random values. It
should be emphasized that assumption of uniformity in
the extremal conditions does notmean that stationary dis-
tribution of fitness is also uniform. On the contrary, much
less trivial distributions (with remarkable preference of
large fitness values) emerge as a consequence of inherent
nonlinearity. The argument in favor of the irrelevance of
generated distributions is that stochastic updates are for
many times less-frequent compared to the deterministic
updates incorporated into the extremal dynamics scheme.
It suggest that redistribution of fluctuations and forma-
tion of stationary distributions is prevailingly driven by
nonlinearities.
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The stochastic updates contained in Equations 10 and
12 are of different type. In this case, the use of uni-
form distribution is mainly for technical and simplis-
tic reasons, because the resulting values of col must be
limited to 0 ≤ col ≤ 1. On the other hand, the
two stochastic relations are built to maintain history
and continuance in a value of col since the ‘new’ val-
ues are obtained from the ‘old’ ones by adding random
displacements.
4.5 High-level code description and holistic view of the
algorithm
The aforementioned low-level computational items can
be integrated into the high-level description which
includes the following:
1. setting of the model parameters:
abe, apr,i, amodn, acoth, amoup, apm, amoext;
2. setting of the random initial condition(s) for demand
and price vectors
3. loop Monte Carlo simulation steps
4. calculation of demand bl, l = 1, 2, . . . ,Npu using
Equations 3 and 4.
5. including of the insurance policy for all
agents
5.1. calculation of the insurance fee Equation 10 for
all agents
5.2. calculation of the compensation using Equation 12
for all agents
6. extremal dynamics applied to pl and col according





Figure 1 The monitoring of the transition state showing the punctuated equilibria for the prices p1,p2,p3,p4 of four selected PUs.
Calculated for amoup = 0.02, amodn = 0.002. We see that price moves as depicted are interrupted by seldom reorganizing events described by
Equations 18 and 17 (a,b,c,d). Similar bursts of activity are typical for all applications of Bak-Sneppen extremal rules. The time-dependencies are
supplemented by the histograms constructed for p1 and p4. We see that distribution of prices comprises large and small peak (e,f). The peak
presence has been verified using several independent simulation runs.
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Figure 2 The transition regime of the cooperative parameter col
for all PUs l = 1, 2, . . . ,Npu. The visible smearing of the initial
condition. The uphill relatively fast moves are less visible than the
slower downhill moves. One may estimate that the formation of the
asymptotic steady-state regime corresponds approximately to 1,000
MCs.
The main steps important for understanding of the whole
dynamical system can be summarized as follows. The
actual demands of PUs reflect filtered (or historical) val-
ues and actual competing prices and spectral efficiencies.
The calculated demands for spectrum are then used to
determine profits and profit returns. The ranking of profit
returns yields further changes in the cooperation level
due to extremal dynamics as a model used to simulate
coevolution of PUs. The information about system state
obtained allows updates of spectrum prices and cooper-
ation levels of selected users with actually extremely low
profitable strategies. The insurance system is pushing PUs
to adapt their levels of cooperation (or fuzzy cooperation)
according to the actual economic situation. The participa-
tion in the insurance coverage suppresses fluctuations in
Figure 3 The initial regime of pr(t)pool. It verifies the positivity of prpool
in the coincidence with the rules imposed on the insurance policy.
Figure 4 The initial behavior of the profits of all PUs. Figure
highlights radical coevolutionary change (nearly 1,100 MCs) with very
high losses. Based on the similar observations we suggested averages
of the type [pr−]av /[pr+]av.
the profits by redistributing of the financial resources of
the insurance pool.
5 Simulation results
We perform the iterative simulation of the system with
Npu = 10 characterized by the following set of parame-
ters: abe = 0.2, abe = 0.2, apm = 0.5, aco = 1.7, amodn =
0.002, acoth = 0.15, acoext = 0.05, pdn = 0.1, pup = 2,
psd = 0.05, btot = 1, kmin = 1, and kmax = 2, for nonuni-
form settings ki = kmin+(kmax−kmin) i−1Npu−1 and uniform
apr,i = apr = 6, wb,i = 1, i = 1, 2, . . . ,Npu. The sim-
ulation we are presenting here are primarily focused on
the role of the parameter amoup for the creation and sta-
bilization of the fuzzy cooperative insurance regime. We
also study less intuitive side effects, which accompany this
regime. Despite the above choice of the parameters is very
specific, our extensive simulations show that scenario we
proposed remains unchanged for sufficiently broad class
of the model parameters.
The first simulation experiments have been applied to
decide on the number of steps to simulate for given system
size. Similarly as in other branches of simulation science
[25], the number is deduced from nonstationary transition
decay regime associated with the smearing of the informa-
tion included in the initial conditions. Another simulation
request is related mainly on the obtaining of the statis-
tical features of the asymptotic steady-state regime. The
optimization of simulation times yields simulation time
MCtot = 200, 000 Monte Carlo steps (per system), where
information from the initial MCini = 5, 000 steps is
discarded in order to guarantee the initial stage is not
captured by the estimates of the mean values. The steady-
state regime may be described by means of the averages
defined by
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Figure 5 Important issue of the paper: cooperativeness is
controlled by the parameter amoup. The computational details are
presented in Equation 12. (top) We see that the parametric region
0.1 < amoup < 0.35 may be roughly associated with the vicinity of
the critical point (amoup)crit . (bottom) Histograms of comean, which
displays radical differences for distinct amoup. The differences in the



















































































Here stdev(...) reads for the standard deviation and
1(cond)with the condition cond ∈ {true, false} is the indi-
cator function such that 1(true) = 1 and 1(false) = 0.
Such indication of the sign of events is of the special inter-
est from the point of view of the insurance systems, where
we search for the regimes which supplies elimination of
the negative events.
The simulation outputs, which illustrate the dynamics
and initial transition regime are depicted in Figures 1, 2, 3,
and 4 (in the case of the prices the simulations are supple-
mented by their stationary distributions). The simulations
show the typical patterns of themovements, which are sig-
natures of the punctuated equilibria. It should be noted
that analogous paths are typical for the models of self-
organized criticality, to which the Bak-Sneppenmodel and
its modifications/applications belongs.
Figure 6 The mean profit per primary user plotted against
amoup. (top) The existence of the optimal mean (critical) profit is
demonstrated. The profit increase may be perceived as a
manifestation of the emergence of the oligopolistic (hidden) market.
(bottom) The histograms indicate profound change in the
equilibrium statistics of the instant systemic profits.
Horváth et al. EURASIP Journal onWireless Communications and Networking 2013, 2013:261 Page 11 of 14
http://jwcn.eurasipjournals.com/content/2013/1/261
Figure 7 The dispersion of the profits as a function of amoup. In
this case the position of the critical point can be defined by the
threshold (approached from below) of this characteristics.
The main simulation findings stem from the statistical
analysis obtained for the steady-state asymptotic long-
term regime (see definition of averages in Equation 19.
They can be summarized as follows:
1. The mean level of the cooperation raises with the
parameter amoup in agreement with the expectations
and model formulation (see Figure 5). Interestingly,
the simulations confirm very and interesting
unexpected aspect of the proposed model, which is
common for many systems of the interacting entities.
It uncovers an existence of the threshold-type
qualitative structure change of the systemic mean
comean which may be associated with the critical or
phase transition point in the parameter amoup.
However, we must be cautious with this notion. It is
used to characterize distinct forms - macrostates of
Figure 8 The mean price as a function of the parameter amoup.
The mean price increase is interpreted as an emergence of the
partially oligopolistic market. Clearly, the profits are increased at the
expense of SUs. In our work we present arguments to support the
proposition that price cusp roughly defines the critical point (phase
transition).
Figure 9 The mean dispersion of the prices. The remarkable
influence of the cooperation of PUs on the price dispersion. The
bottom of the valley may be associated with the phase transition.
the matter. In the narrow cognitive radio economics
context, the phases are interlinked to differences in
the collective behavior of PUs. It is believed that the
phase transitions play an important role in the
economics [26] or innovation management, but
because of the lack of appropriate data it usually
remains implicit. For instance, the phase transition in
the field of economics may refer to the unexpectedly
large variations when the exogenous conditions
change. During the phase transition (radical change
in the economic sense) of a given system, certain
properties vary discontinuously as a result of the
external (exogenous) condition, such as temperature.
We study the model where exogeneity is related to
the preferences and motivations described by the
idiosyncratic parameter amoup that is not explainable
within the proposed model. In the simulation we
Figure 10 The ratio of averages demonstrates the absorption of
the losses with amoup increasing. The qualitative change in the
parametric space is remarkable. See Figure 11 where the shapes of
the pri distributions are given.
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Figure 11 The essential achievement of the research on the
design of the cognitive radio insurance system. Although the
losses are very rare, the amount of money they spend can be very
high. The density plot showing the profits and losses PUs caused by
the different amoup. We see that partial absorption of the large losses
can be achieved due to enhanced cooperation level. Initially, the
density plot of the system with lack of the mean cooperation
(comean  0.17) is constructed for the parametric choice
amoup = 0.04. It is compared here with density plot corresponding to
higher cooperation (comean  0.24), which stems from the simulation
at amoup = 0.1.
observe that the time average of the systemic mean
comean increases with amoup. On the other hand, we
see from Figure 5 that the characterization via [ co]av
is not sufficiently comprehensive because the
histograms of comean are very broad and skew. More
important for the classification and understanding of
the observed phase transition seems to be the view
that phases differ mainly in the risk and benefit
distribution. For a given settings of parameters, we
hypothesize that parameter (amoup)crit ∼ 0.1 to 0.35
separates the phase (regime) of the low-cooperation
amoup < (amoup)crit from the phase (regime) of the
high-cooperation amoup > (amoup)crit. Further
research is required to consider the role of
fluctuations surrounding the critical point in greater
detail.
2. The essential feature accompanying critical behavior
is that fluctuations are passing through all the system
units (mainly because of demand of SUs), and thus
they are reflected by many characteristics simulta-
neously, e.g., mean profits (see Figures 6 and 7). The
particular confirmation of the criticality may be seen
also in Figures 8 and 9.
3. The dynamics at the vicinity of critical point yields
higher coordination of PUs and more evidence on
Figure 12 The simulation reveals an increase of the insurance
reserves comprised in the insurance pool. The indirect multilateral
cooperation is controlled by the parameter amoup.
the convergence of the prices (see Figure 9), which
suggests that oligopolistic coordination of the PUs
emerges in a bottom-up self-organized way under
the unconscious support of the common insurance
authority - spectrum exchange server. It is worth
mentioning that functioning of the spectrum
exchange server needs storage of the actual values of
prpool and col.
4. The differences in the stability of the insurance
system are best reflected by the indicator
[pr−]av/[pr+]av. This ratio of averages is mainly
constructed to demonstrate an importance of the
insurance service, which enables to absorb the
financial losses (see Figure 10). The finding is
consistent with the density plot (see Figure 11)
showing the details of profit fluctuations.
5. The model property reserves of the insurance pool
are highly affected by the cooperation which is
demonstrated in Figure 12. The model explains
satisfactorily the simple fact that higher consumer’s
trust in insurance increases insurance pool.
6. In many of theoretical physics’s models exhibiting
phase transitions, there exist well-established and
objectively determined criteria how to extrapolate
from the finite size towards asymptotic solutions
[25]. When the numerical treatment is related to the
‘new’ complex models, the criteria cause more
problems since the numerical routine is not
universally straightforward and thus the achievement
of asymptotic regime may represent a
time-consuming and difficult task. Therefore, in such
cases we are usually in position to anticipate the view
regarding the large finite-system sizes only.
The results of the calculations performed for
Npu = 10, 20, 40 are shown in Figure 13. In the figure
caption we describe methodology consisting of the





Figure 13 The preliminary analysis of the finite-size effects and phase transition scenario. The calculation has been carried out for
Npu = 10, 20, 40. The analysis of dependence [stdev(p)]av (amoup) (a) yields rather small finite-size values (amoup)crit ∼ 0.1 (for Npu = 10),
(amoup)crit ∼ 0.14 (for Npu = 20), (amoup)crit ∼ 0.22 (for Npu = 40) (these values are determined as bottoms of valleys). Much higher estimate∼ 0.32
for Npu = 40 stems from [stdev(pr)]av (amoup) (b). In agreement with general point of view the simulations confirm that the form of statistical
averages at the vicinity of the transition sharpen with Npu increasing. We can see that there are rather different characteristics with specific
distinctions in the positions of the anomalies (valleys), which may serve as candidates for estimates of critical points (c,d,e,f). Because of the
well-known technical difficulties in capturing of asymptotic value [25], we could not reliably determine (amoup)crit .
transition point estimate deduced from the ‘bottoms
of valleys’ of the averaged dispersions of
[stdev(p)]av (amoup) (or alternatively
[stdev(pr)]av (amoup)) dependence. The ‘valleys,
which gradually sharpen’ as the number of PUs goes
up, are considered here to be symptomatic of the
phase transitions.
6 Conclusions
The emergence of the structures, patterns and unexpected
properties, which cannot be directly deduced from the
properties of the system definition, represents one of the
strongest motivations that led us to perform an exten-
sive agent-based simulation of the cognitive radio model
supplemented with insurance service. In agreement with
previous studies of the cognitive radio networks, we con-
firm that price of the service should increase with the
level of cooperation, which leads to the higher costs for
SUs. When seen from the perspective of the economic
theory, the observed phenomenon may be identified as a
formation of the oligopoly market. Despite the proposed
computational model is of somewhat moderate level of
the complexity, the dynamics it exhibits is beyond the
scope of the familiar analytical formulations. The sim-
ulation demonstrates the possible benefits or attributes
or costs resulting from the fuzzyfied access to the insur-
ance system (degree to which PU agrees in its relations
to other PUs), which prevents it from the unexpected
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(unpredictable) and large losses. The specific emergent
phenomenon that we may pay attention to represents the
cusp-shaped threshold in the parametric space. We pre-
sented arguments for the view that this threshold point
may be associated with the phase transition, but the sup-
position needs more concentrated computational effort
and theoretical understanding. On the basis of the pre-
liminary investigations, we can state that the critical point
separates two dynamic phases corresponding to differ-
ent cooperative distributions. The location of the critical
parameter has been briefly discussed from the point of
view of the finite-size analysis (see e.g. [25]).
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